Abstract-We model the aggregate overnight demand for electricity by a large community of (possibly hybrid) plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) each of whose power demand follows a prescribed profile and is interruptible. The community is served by a regional electrical utility which is assumed to purchase electricity from a state/national distribution grid according to a flat-rate φ per kilowatt-unit-time up to a threshold L, and thereafter overage (demand > L) charges π > φ are leveed per kilowatt-unit-time. Rather than a spot-price system for household consumers (which would necessarily need to be operated by automated means overnight when most consumers sleep), the "grid" (regional utility) is "smart" in that it monitors its total load and, when overages threaten, can reduce load by signaling certain consumers to interrupt charging and defer their charging load by one unit of time. In this paper, we model the uninterrupted load by a Gaussian process which we justify by means of a functional central limit theorem (FCLT). This limiting Gaussian process is the arrival process of a discrete-time queue which is used to model the (partially) interrupted and deferred load over a finite time-horizon. We can then compute the mean amount of overage at the end of this time horizon (say at 6 AM when charging is to be completed ahead of the morning commute).
I. INTRODUCTION
Much activity has recently focused on highly dynamic economic models for electricity distribution systems based on precise and ubiquitous load and network metering [14] , [18] . An Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is intended to inform a deregulated spot-price system which is in turn intended to incentivize the efficiencies found in free markets (e.g., [26] , [13] , [5] ), in particular through demand-side management. Such consumer load management is even more crucial as plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), are coming to the market [20] , [15] . With battery capacities varying from 15 to 50 kWh, these vehicles are expected to double the average household load during charging time [11] .
The design of appropriate incentives and efficient energyconsumption scheduling algorithms (e.g., [17] , [2] , [15] ) is a primary goal for the smart grid (or "grid modernization"), i.e., incentivizing consumers to offload demand to off-peak periods, also known as "peak shaving," see, e.g., [28] .
Basically, there are two frameworks, one in which the grid signals the consumers with prices and let them decide, and another where the grid controls special circuits in each of the consumers' houses and can cycle power to loads on them to shave peak demand. As we are interested in automated decisions by both the grid and the consumers (as would be the case in the evening while electric vehicles are charging and consumers are sleeping), we herein assume that the load on the grid can be deferred. We assume that consumers who both submit to control by the grid of their primary evening power load (plug-in electric vehicle) and choose a random start time of their load (so as to desynchronize demand and reduce the "load" on the deferment mechanism) will be charged discounted overages (i.e., costs when total demand is greater than a prescribed threshold, cf. (17)) if they do occur. By simply monitoring the start time of a consumer's evening power consumption over several evenings, the grid can perform a straightforward statistical test to reckon the latter.
Several authors have considered "smart" consumers in a spot-price system, e.g., [15] , based on the Nash certainty equivalence principle for the Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) framework [8] , or see, e.g., [16] for smart consumers of a queueing system as in Section IV below. We instead assume that the regional utility is "smart" in its ability to dynamically defer demand to avoid overages, and to steady and reduce (shave) peak total power demand.
The focus of this paper is on centralized management by a regional utility of its collective PEV/PHEV load, a load which will likely be borne in the earlier morning hours while most consumers sleep. We assume that the utility's ability to defer load would be overwhelmed if all consumers simultaneously started charging. That is, one can expect that a small, say 10%, perceived total overage can be feasibly alleviated by selecting slightly more than 10% of active users to defer; the deferred users are possibly chosen at random when neither their current individual demands nor the overage amount are precisely known, cf. Section V. Thus, to avoid spikes in demand due to possibly synchronized consumers, particularly at the start of charging period, we assume that, night after night, the consumers independently and uniformly at random choose initial start times in the evening charging intervals, either voluntarily or by request of the utility, cf. Section II-B. Given this, there may still be moderate overage periods which the utility will need to manage by deferring demand. By using smart meters, the regional utility can obtain an empirical starttime distribution for each consumer to police their compliance with a randomly chosen start-time; consumers who are deemed in compliance can be assigned a reduced share of any overage charges incurred.
Given a characterization of aggregate load by a Gaussian process (justified by a FCLT) enabled by this assumption of asynchronous consumers, a regional utility can seek to minimize its own objective function which is a weighted 2 combination of the probability of overage (social welfare) and the contractual cost of their supply from a broader electrical distribution system. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We motivate our model of consumer demand without deferment in Section II. In Section III, we use a functional central limit theorem (FCLT) to derive a simple diffusion model of the undeferred load on the utility. In Section IV, we summarize our discrete-time load-deferment framework, potentially resulting in overages at the end of the deferment interval, and describe a numerical study under idealized load deferment. We conclude with a discussion of future work in Section V, e.g., spanning issues of how to choose which consumers to defer and how to predict overages in a time interval.
II. PROBLEM SET-UP
We consider a T -hour time period, e.g., T = 8 hours from 10PM to 6AM, during which n consumers need to automatically schedule their electrical demand. Note that our time horizon is finite since consumers do not want their jobs to be indefinitely delayed.
A. Demand
We considered two broad types of power-consumption profiles for each consumer: constant and unimodal. The former case is covered in [21] . In both cases, we assume that demand from non-PEV/PHEV loads is negligible considering our problem context of is during the late evening and early morning, and the fact that PEV/PHEV loads will tend to be dramatically larger than those of common household appliances.
A unimodal power consumption profile h is more typical when charging an initially empty, idealized Lithium-Ion (LiIon) battery [23] , [7] : initially, the current is constant and the voltage grows until a peak-power threshold at time ζ > 0 is reached, whereafter the voltage is constant and the current diminishes. We will approximate this power charging rate by a triangle-pulse function, h(t), starting at time 0 with support η > ζ and peak value H at time ζ; see top graph of Figure 1 . The h(t) function has the following explicit expression
(1)
A given smart grid PEV consumer at a given night may have a residual charge on their battery 1 . So, their power demand profile will look like, e.g., the front-clipped (advanced) triangle pulse at the bottom of Figure 1 , i.e.,
h(t + ξ; η, H, ζ)u(t),
where u is Heaviside's unit-step function and ξ > 0 is the time corresponding to the amount of residual charge α = h(ξ). So, the PEV power consumption profile of the i th residential smart grid consumer is here parameterized by
where again τ i is the starting time of service request, i.e.,
1 Or consumers may have auxiliary on-site power generation (e.g., p. 3 of [24] ) which they could use to charge their battery before engaging the grid. Note that the factor (ξ, α := h(ξ)) may alternatively (or additionally) reflect the presence and initial use of a limited local energy supply generated by, e.g., solar radiation or wind during the day and stored by the consumer for later use.
a) Random demand parameters: Additionally, assume that the parameters, η i , ζ i and H i are mutually independent random variables over consumer index i. Also, assume that the
For the case of unimodal power profile, note from the distribution of these parameters we can obtain the moments of the initial charge: Eα = Eh(ξ) =: m α and var(α) = var(h(ξ)) =: σ 2 α . Variations in the parameters η i , ζ i and H i may be naturally due to different types/models of batteries used in different hybrid electric and different purely electric vehicles, as well as variations due to manufacture and due to performance degradation with age, cf. Section III.
So, the power-consumption profiles for different consumers are independent. Assume that the joint distributions of (ξ, η, H, ζ) are such that there are K classes of profiles/flags with the k
. That is, we have K-quantized initial battery charge in the consumer population under consideration, leading to K different classes of residual power-consumption profiles. Accounting for the distribution of initial battery charge is important as most consumers will likely not allow their car battery to come close to complete discharge (empty) due to "range anxiety."
The total energy demand for a consumer of class k is simply
which does not depend on the start time τ
, of course. So, dropping the subscript i for simplicity, That is, the total energy demand for any consumer is β = β (k) with probability p (k) .
B. Supply from the regional utility
First suppose that the utility employs a dynamic system wherein the spot prices are periodically communicated to the consumers' computer (during the evening) so that a preprogrammed policy of "engagement" in the power grid can be employed, e.g., if the spot-price is below a threshold, then charge the battery during the corresponding period of time. If all consumers follow such policies, then potentially dramatic swings in demand may ensue 2 . To mitigate such swings, the utility could also signal the consumers of an overload situation which will result in overage charges notwithstanding the low spot price just announced. Consumers may randomly delay engagement times to charge their batteries on with the grid in order to avoid synchronization of their demand, particularly if an overload is signaled 3 . Again, in the following, a highly dynamic spot-price system is assumed not in play. Rather, we assume that the utility has a good estimate of the statistics of aggregate consumer demand and this knowledge has informed a contract with the distribution system 4 : a flat rate φ per kilowatt-unit-time up to a threshold L, after which an overage charge π > φ per kilowattunit-time is leveed. Also, we assume that consumers select a start-time for their demand chosen uniformly at random from
η max , and η max is the maximum service request duration. The goal of this strategy is to "even out" demand 5 , cf. (next) Section III.
III. DIFFUSION APPROXIMATION OF UNDEFERRED ENERGY CONSUMPTION As motivated by the previous subsection, we now assume that the start time of demand for each consumer i, τ i , is chosen independently and uniformly at random from the continuous interval of time [0, T o ] (for simplicity in this section). Assuming the number of consumers n 1 is given, by conditional uniformity the arrival epochs {τ i : i ≥ 1} of service requests can be regarded as the arrival times of a Poisson process {N (t) : t ≥ 0}. Let λ = n/T o be its arrival rate.
Let λ (k) = p (k) λ be the arrival rate of the class-k consumers and {N (k) (t) : t ≥ 0} as the corresponding Poisson process with arrival epochs {τ
is a Poisson process with rate λ and p (k) = lim n→∞ N (k) (t)/N (t). When the consumption profiles are unimodal, the total instantaneous power charging rate for class k consumers is given by the flag process Fig. 2 . Illustrative example of total load C and the total instantaneous power charging rate for all consumers is given by
The energy consumption for all class k consumers is given by the integrated (average) flag process
and the energy consumption for all consumers is given by
For an illustrative example with homogeneous consumers, Figure 2 shows three typical sample paths of the total load C over [0, T ] when T = 10, N = 5000, η = 2, ζ = 1, H = 1, and ξ uniform on {0, η/4, η/2, 3η/4} (i.e., K = 4). That is, given N = 5000, the delays τ were chosen independently and uniformly distributed on the time interval (consistent with the conditional uniformity property of a Poisson process). We now model the process C on the interval [η, T o = T − η] as a stationary diffusion.
We take an asymptotic approach by scaling the processes {D (k) (t) : t ≥ 0} and {C (k) (t) : t ≥ 0} by the total arrival rate λ and letting λ → ∞. Assume that there existλ k ∈ (0, 1) such that
where
The proof of the following theorem, based on Theorem 1 of [10] , is detailed in [21] . 4 Theorem 1: If the consumption profiles are unimodal as above and if
From Theorem 1, we can approximate the energy consumption up to time t, C(t), for large λ by
Given the threshold total charging rate L with
L > λμ
at each time and a fixed time window t o , we define the energy consumption overages above
The proof of the following theorem is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 2:
When the demand is large, the expected energy
where Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Note that λμ < L, so the first term on the right hand side of (14) is negative, but the second term will dominate and the sum is nonnegative.
IV. SMART GRID SCHEDULING BY LOAD DEFERRAL A. Summary framework
Assume that the electricity pricing framework has two stages (as in e.g., [1] but based aggregate demand rather than on a per-consumer basis). Also assume that the smart grid is aware of aggregate demand X at each epoch of duration t o . If the aggregate demand exceeds a threshold (L), we assume that the smart grid is capable of deferring the overage (X −L) to the next epoch. To do so, the grid needs to be able to predict that an overage will occur at the start of the epoch, ascertain which consumers to defer, and be able to pause the power supply to those consumers, cf. Section V. Note that the charging of Lithium-ion based car batteries can be paused without significant adverse effects on their performance or longevity [7] .
B. Overage
Theorem 1 gives an expression for the limiting total energy consumption (12) 
We assume idealized deferment of the excess aggregate load, where the carry-over load is the backlog of a discretetime GI/D/1 queue X with i.i.d. arrivals P j and deterministic service Lt o ,
with X 0 = 0. Let J = T o /t o and note that the residual demand over the final (post deferment) epoch
, and Y 0 = 0. Thus, we obtain the following approximation of the distribution of X J by applying the one-sided first passage time distribution for Brownian motion with drift coefficient [λμ−L]t o and variance coefficient λσ 2 t o , see, e.g., (11) in section 1.8 of [6] ,
So, we assume the average total overages leveed by the utility will be
where π $/kWh is the overage billing rate.
C. Numerical example and discussion
For a typical example, we took: λ = 1000 consumers/h (hour), T o = 5h and T = 8h (so that n = λT o = 5000 consumers and η max = T − T o = 3h), t o = 0.05h (i.e., 3 minutes), and μ = 5 kWh/consumer [12] . The distribution of X J is shown in Figure 3 for L = 6000 (> λμ), and σ = 100.
Following intuition, computed overages Ω were decreasing in L and increasing in σ, see Figure 4 for the numerical example above. Note that if π(L) is increasing in L (i.e., the overage charge per kWh increases with overage threshold), then the total overage charges π(L)Ω(L) may be unimodal with a unique minimizing threshold L * . This optimal threshold L * , depending on an estimation of the total consumer demand, would also inform the contract negotiated between the utility under consideration and the electrical distribution system. Again, in this paper we assume ideal deferral achieved either through prompt consumer cooperation (charge interruption) upon utility overage signalling, or through direct deferral control of consumer power consumption by the utility. The minimal overage charges thus achieved motivate consumer deferral cooperation. 
V. DISCUSSION OF FUTURE WORK
As future work, we plan to employ a large deviations principle, instead of central limit theorem approximation, to model aggregate demand, see e.g., [3] .
We can also model the presence of variable power supply (due to wind or solar) as a time-varying thresholdL(t) ≥ L. Note that car battery storage systems are ideally suited to exploit variable supply.
Several authors have explored the possibility of exploiting supply from the (adequately or excessively charged) car batteries themselves to avoid overages by aggregate demand on the utility, in addition to the idea of consumers using their own car batteries as back-up power supply during failure periods of the grid.
A. Choosing which consumers to interrupt and defer
Simply, if there will be ω% energy overage in an interval (jt o to (j + 1)t o ), then the grid could defer ω% of the consumers chosen uniformly at random; clearly, this will result in greater variance for X J . Alternatively, deferment could be based on a score S of each consumer's residual power-demand profile and the remaining time T − t. For example, for a consumer that started at time τ with initial charge zero, a large score would correspond to a larger probability of deferment, so that the score
would be an increasing function of its first argument (current/instantaneous power demand) and a decreasing function of the last two arguments (residual energy demand, and residual charge time as a fraction of remaining time), e.g., [2] .
B. Predicting overages
It would be more realistic to expect that the grid will only know the instantaneous power demand X(jt o ) at the start of the j th interval, rather than the overages in that interval, and to account for the required delays for communication and actuation. Using the reflection principle, the grid can compute the risk of overage for each epoch j,
max , the grid could defer some percentage of the consumers so that the overage risk in the interval is reduced to the maximum allowable, ρ max .
C. Policing consumers and sharing overages
Such deferment policy may need to rely on trusting the residual demand reported by the consumer, unless that was somehow securely metered by the grid. Again note that smart metering could be used to detect if a consumer misstates their load, does not obey a request to defer, or simply does not disclose their demand to the grid for purposes of "smart" deferment. Given simple applied cryptographic techniques (which may be in play in any case to ensure privacy), the utility can accept load attestations from the consumers in a non-repudiatable fashion (i.e., using accompanying digital signatures) 6 . We reiterate how the grid can easily police whether the consumers start at random times based on sampling their starting times night after night and capturing the distribution and comparing to a uniform via, e.g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov [4] .
Recall that in our model, total overages are nominally shared by all significant overnight electricity consumers in proportion to their energy consumption, peak power demand, or some combination. Alternatively, uncooperative consumers might be penalized with an additional overage share, particularly if significant overages are experienced prior to the end-time of the charging period, T , notwithstanding deferment actions by the grid. (14) .
